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CASE BRIEFS

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A Plaintiff's Claim Will Be Dismissed for a Failure to State a Claim
Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division dismissed the plaintiffs amended complaint for
failure to plead with particularity and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.1
Obert-Hong is a physician and former Advocate employee. 2
Defendants participated in various federal healthcare programs,
including Medicare, Medicaid, and Tricare. 3 The relator claimed that
defendants illegally offered doctors special benefits to induce them to
refer federal patients to its hospitals. 4 Advocate allegedly paid
commercially unreasonable amounts to acquire practices, signed
doctors to contracts mandating that all referrals be to SSH and paid
them a percentage of fees collected for referred patients. 5 The plaintiff
alleged that these actions violated the Anti-Kickback act and the Stark
Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that their compliance
certifications were not false claims because the alleged practices were
permissible under the Anti-Kickback and Stark Laws.7 They also

'United States v. Obert-Hong, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1662 at *1.

2Id at *2.

lid
4
id
5

6 1d" at

*2 *

6Obert-Hong,
7

Id. at *3.

2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1662 at *2.
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maintained that the complaint did not plead fraud with particularity, as
is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b). °
The court first looked at the statutory framework of each statute
cited in plaintiffs complaint. 9 The court found that the Stark Act
statute was designed to prevent abusive self-referrals and the AntiKickback Act focused on the circumstances surrounding the referrals
themselves.' 0 While the court conceded that a hospital's acquisition of
a medical practice could implicate the Anti-Kickback act, defendants
correctly stated that safe harbors only become consequential if the
conduct is otherwise proscribed." The Anti-Kickback Act does not
prohibit hospitals from acquiring medical practices, nor does it
preclude the seller-doctor from making referrals to the buyer-hospital,
provided there are no economic inducements for the referral. 12 The
court then stated that the Stark Act statute contains an exception for
isolated transactions, even though a hospital's acquisition of a hospital
can implicate the Act's prohibition of financial relationships between
referring physicians and referee-hospitals.13
The court next said that the defendants' percentage compensation
was based on personally performed services, not referrals, there was no
economic inducement to refer patients. 14 All compensation paid to
15
these doctors fell within the Anti-Kickback employee exception.
Accordingly, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. 1 6 United
States v. Obert-Hong,2002 U.S. Dist.LEIS 1662.
A Case Will Be Dismissed For a Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Against A Defendant and A Failure to File a Health Care Affidavit
The Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, Division One,
found that there was a lack of personal jurisdiction against the Indiana
'id.
9

1d. at *4-6.

'°Id. at *5-6.
"Obert-Hong,
2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1662 at *7.
12 d.
1d at *8.

'Id. at "13.
15Id.
6

1

Obert-Hong, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1662 at *14.
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defendants and that plaintiff failed to file a health care affidavit,
thereby affirming the decision of the trial court. 17 Plaintiff's motion
to
18
strike the brief and/or dismiss the appeal were denied as moot.
Patricia Mello (patient, mother of plaintiff) entered St. Joseph
Medical Center (SJMC) on December 19, 1996 for elective femoral
bypass surgery. 9 She was treated by: Dr. Giliberto, an osteopathic
surgeon; Dr. Gibson, a cardiologist; and Dr. Guentert, a critical care
specialist. 20 Plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent and
breached the standard of care in pressuring patient to undergo surgery
and in providing post-operative care, which resulted in a drug induced
coma, high fever, and pneumonia. 2 ' On January 1, 1997, plaintiff
brought in a new physician to treat patient, and patient was transferred
to Barnes-Jewish Hospital (BJH), where plaintiff alleges that BJH,
University, and Dr. Lynch committed additional acts of malpractice on
plaintiff.22 Patient died at BJi- on February 6, 1997.23
Plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries, loss of
chance of recovery, battery/lack of informed consent, wrongful death,
and violations of various state and federal policies on the care and
treatment of the elderly.24 The court granted Indiana defendants motion
25
to dismiss on the grounds that Missouri lacked personal jurisdiction.
Missouri defendants then moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff
failed to file a health care affidavit, which was granted.26 On appeal,
plaintiff challenged the dismissal of Indiana defendants for lack of
jurisdiction and the dismissal of her claims against the Missouri
defendants for failure to file a health care affidavit.27
Plaintiff cited two points against Indiana defendants' claim.28
First, she asserted that the court committed a number of procedural
17

Mello v. Giliberto Jr., 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 233 at *29 (C.A. Mo. Feb 5, 2002).

S8Id.
'2091d. at 1.
1d. at2.
21
1d.

22Mello 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 233 at *2.
2Id.

241d at *2-3.
2Id.
26

1d.

27

Mello 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 233 at *2-3.

281d.

at *5.
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errors in disposing of the motion, which resulted in a denial of due
process. 29 She then contended that the Indiana defendants were subject
to Missouri's Long Arm Statute because they committed a tort to
business transactions in Missouri. 30 The court dismissed the first point
by stating that plaintiff failed to show that the trial court erred in the
manner in which it handled the motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. 31 The court then stated that the second argument had no
weight because plaintiffs theories did not support her claims that
defendants committed a tortuous act or conducted business in the state
of Missouri.32

In opposition to defendant's claim that plaintiff failed to file a
health care affidavit, plaintiff argued that no health care affidavit was
required in this case.33 Alternatively, the plaintiff contended that she
substantially complied with the statute. 34 The court found that all of the
counts in plaintiffs petition were within the statute requiring an
affidavit as the plaintiffs claims related solely to the wrongful acts of
the health care providers and the damages sought were for patients
personal injuries and death.35 Accordingly, the court of appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.36 Mello v. Giliberto Jr., 2002
Mo. App. LEXIS 233 at *29 (C.A. Mo. Feb 5, 2002).
A Defendant is Not Liable to Pay Claim Until Liability is
Determined In Court
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held
that defendant was not liable for failing to pay the claim until after
liability was established in court, and defendant was not held liable for
intentionally or recklessly causing emotional distress nor for breach of

9Id.

301d.
3"id. at
32

*11.

Mello 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 233 at "18.

33Id. at *22.
34Id. at *23.
351d. at *26.

'61d. at *29-30.
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its insurance contract
for failure to pay where liability was not
37
clear.
reasonably
Plaintiffs brought action against Dr. Tufo, defendant, for
wrongful death and medical malpractice on behalf of their son, Adam
Behn. Adam, born on June 27, 1966, had a long history of substance
abuse and self destructive behavior. 39 On February 27, 1990, Adam
came to Norwood Hospital after attempting suicide by cutting his left
wrist. 40 After receiving treatment, Adam was referred to Tufo, a
psychiatrist who was affiliated with the hospital. 41 After continuous
appointments with Tufo, Adam was hospitalized at Norwood Hospital
for taking a combination of alcohol, valium, and codeine. 42 Adam
continued treatment after this incident with Tufo.43 On September 27,
1990, after repeated admissions, Adam was admitted to Arbour
Hospital in Boston for treatment of depression and auditory
hallucinations with suicidal content. 44 Tufo never heard from Adam or
any other member of the Behn family after October of that year. 45 On
January 29, 1991, Adam committed suicide by taking 50 tablets of the
medication Pamelor. 46 On April 11, 1997, the Middlesex Superior
Court, after jury deliberations, awarded the plaintiffs $1,153,900 with a
comparative negligence of 25%, which reduced the damages to
$915,425. 47 The parties reached a settlement on punitive damages
before the verdict was entered.48
Legion raised two procedural issues on appeal that it claimed
prevented the suit from being properly before the court.4 9 It argued that
the settlement in the case barred the suit against Legion and that the
37Behn v.Legion

Insurance Company, 173 F. Supp. 2d 105, 106 (D.Mass. Nov. 30,

2001).
3
"1d. at 107.
39Id. at
40
41

108.

d.

1d.

42
43

Behn, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
1d.

44Id. at 109.
451d.
46

1d.
Behn, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 111.

47

4"Id.
49

Id. at 112.
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statute of limitations ran prior to the filing of the claim. 50 The court
found that the liability in the underlying medical malpractice claim was
never clearly established.5 1 Furthermore, the plaintiff's original demand
was in excess of the policy limits and Legion's estimate of potential
52
liability. Accordingly, judgment for the defendant was entered on all
counts. 53 Behn v. Legion Insurance Company, 173 F Supp. 2d 105, 106
(D. Mass. Nov. 30, 2001).

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Doctors Practicing in Federally Funded Clinics Were Neither
Doctors Nor Covered Contractors Under the FSHCAA
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
held the United States correctly showed that doctors practicing at a
federally funded clinic
were neither employees nor covered contractors
54
under the FSHCAA.
On or about January 10, 1996, Idania Fernandez (plaintiff)
presented herself to the Helen B. Bentle5 y Family Health Center for a
pregnancy test, which was positive. Plaintiff received prenatal
treatment from the Family Health Center from January of 1996 to April
of 1996. 56 Throughout the pregnancy, Fernandez experienced
complications which she claimed were misdiagnosed by the doctors at
Mercy Hospital and the Family Health Center. Due to complications,
Fernandez gave birth prematurely to a son,
who suffered from severe
58
respiratory and developmental problems.

I°d.

50M

511d. at 114.
52
Behn, 173
53

1Id. at 117.

F. Supp. 2dat 116.

54

Delvalle v. Sanchez, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1254,1272 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 25, 2001).

55Id. at

I6Id.
57
d
581d

1259.
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Plaintiffs alleged medical negligence in the care of Fernandez
during her pregnancy. 59 Defendants filed a counter-claim against he
United States and the Coconut Family Health Center, Inc. (codefendants) for indemnification.6 0 Plaintiffs third amended complaint
was removed from state court on January 8, 1999 by the Family Health
Center and the United States. 61 In the notice of removal, defendants
alleged that the Family Health Center was an entity receiving federal
grant money and an employee if the United States for the purpose of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 62 On June 24, 1999, the United States was
substituted as the proper party defendant in place of the Family Health
Center. United States then filed a motion for summary judgment on
the cross claim and the fourth amended complaint to the extent that the
parties sought to hold the United States liable for the actions of Dr.
Sanchez, Dr. Femandez-Rocha & Pou, P.A.64 Dr. Sanchez sought
summary judgment on the same issue. 65 Mercy Hospital, Dr. Ramon,
Dr. Portunado and ERMA filed motions for summary judgment in
which they argued that the record was
devoid of any evidence that
66
negligence.
of
finding
a
support
would
The court found that the exclusive remedy for claims against the
United States for the tortuous or negligent conduct of its employees
falls under the FTCA.67 Suits filed under the FTCA are limited to those
that involve claims arising from "the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government ...acting within the
scope of his office or employment." 68 The court found that all of the
circumstances indicated that Dr. Sanchez, Dr. Ramon, and Dr.
69
Femandez-Rocha were not employees of the Family health center.
The court also refused to find the defendants to be contractors within
59

60Delvalle,

170 F. Supp. 2d at 1257-1258.

1d.

621d

"

63Id.
6Delvale,
170 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.
651d.

66Id.
67

1d.at 1263.
68.d .
1
69Delvalle, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
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the scope of FSHCAA. 70 Furthermore, plaintiffs' argument that the
United States was estopped from arguing that the doctors and
professional
association was not covered by the FTCA was rejected by
71
the court.
The court granted the United States motion for summary
judgment, Mercy hospital's motion for summary judgment was granted
in part and denied in part, count VIII of the fourth amended complaint
was dismissed, and all other motions were denied.72 Delvalle v.
Sanchez, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1254,1272 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 25, 2001).
ERISA Does Not Require Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) to Disclose Its Physician Incentive Plan
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the failure of an IHMO to disclose information
regarding its physician compensation scheme was not a breach of its
Employment
Retirement Insurance Security Act (BRISA) fiduciary
3
duty.

7

Plaintiff enrolled into her employer's health plan which was
operated by defendant.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant
misrepresented the amount of insurance coverage provided to its
subscribers.75 She argued that defendant misrepresented the scope of
insurance coverage because the physicians' financial incentives
compromised the independent medical judgment of physicians, and the
health plan stated that patients were covered for all medically necessary
treatments. 76 Plaintiff argued this information was misleading, because
defendant's health plan provided physicians with financial
disincentives to provide optimal health care. 77 She alleged that the
fiduciary duties imposed on defendant by ERISA §404 prohibited
701d.at

1271.

71.[d.
72

1d.at 1279.

73Horvath v. Keystone, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3042.
74
1d. at *1
75
761d. at *3.

1-d.
77.rd.
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misrepresentations, and that defendant was liable for failing to disclose
physician incentive plan to its subscribers.78
Plaintiff alleged that defendant violated its fiduciary duty imposed
by §404 of ERISA, because defendant misrepresented the scope of its
insurance coverage. 79 She further contended that the physician
incentives encourage physicians to provide patients with less care.8 °
Plaintiff demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. 81 Defendant moved for summary judgment, and stated that §404a
of ERISA provides that an ERISA fiduciary must perform "its
functions in the interest of the beneficiaries of the plan with care,82skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing.
The district court disagreed with plaintiff stating that there was
no factual proposition that defendant was on notice that plaintiff
requested its physician incentive scheme.83 The court further
determined that a physician's medical judgment was not compromised,
and plaintiff did not make any requests that would cause defendant to
disclose physician information.8 4 Defendant's motion for summary
judgment granted. 85 Donna Horvath v. Keystone Plan East, Inc., 2000
U.S.Dis. LEXIS 3042.
Scope of the Civil Enforcement Provisions of ERISA
United States District Court held the court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand was granted.8
The plaintiffs sued Aetna for alleged negligent, grossly negligent,
and malicious acts and omissions related to health care decisions that
affected them.8 7 Plaintiffs brought the suit in relation to injuries
78

Horvath, 200 U.S.Dist LEXIS at *4.
1d at *5.

79

sold.
811d.
82
Id.
3
Horvath, 200 U.S.Dist LEXIS at * 19.
84Id.
at *22-23.
5ld. at*1.
86

Ruacho v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of North Texas, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16053
*1
(U.S. Dist., Oct. 5, 2001).
'71d.at *2.
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purportedly caused by a cost reduction agreement between Aetna and
physicians that participate in Aetna's health plans, and because88Aetna
allegedly failed to adequately screen its participating physicians.
The cost reduction component of the plaintiffs' claim related to a
"C-section Incentive Plan" that Aetna uses to encourage participating
physicians to avoid performing cesarean section deliveries.8 9 The
plaintiffs contended that this incentive motivated their physician to
delay conducting a C-section delivery of the plaintiffs' baby, and the
vacuum extractor the physician was attempting
to use caused the baby
9
0
injury.
debilitating
lifelong
and
scarring
Aetna removed the state court action and based jurisdiction on
diversity of citizenship and federal questioning the form of complete
preemption by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).91
The court held no diversity jurisdiction existed since both the
plaintiffs and the defendants were citizens of Texas. 92 Hence the court
only reviewed whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
case. 93 The only way Aetna could have proved subject matter
jurisdiction was to 94show the plaintiffs' claim was completely
preempted by ERISA.
The court followed the Fifth Circuit's Heimann decision which
stated that a cause of action was not completely preempted unless the
claim was preempted by 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) and fell within the scope
of section 1132(a)'s enforcement provisions. 95 The court held that
although Aetna's employee benefit plan which covered plaintiffs was
governed by ERISA, the statutory ERISA preemption provision did not
apply since plaintiffs' claims were not within the scope of the civil
enforcement provisions of ERISA. 96 Therefore, the motion to remand

88Id.
891d.
90,d.

91
Ruacho, 2001
92

id.

U.S. Dist. Lexis 16053 at *2.

931Id.

941d
95

d. at *3-4.
Ruacho, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16053 at *1.

96
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was granted.97 Ruacho v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of North Texas, Inc.,
2001 U.S. Dist.Lexis 16053 *1 ('US. Dist., Oct. 5, 2001).98

EXPERT WITNESS
Expert Testimony Necessary To Establish Res Ipsa Loquitor
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that expert testimony was
needed to establish the standard of care for res ipsa loquitor.99
Plaintiff went to the emergency room for a kidney problem and
was given a drug called §entamicin.100 Plaintiff began suffering from
dizziness and vomiting. 102 Plaintiff visited several physicians and
explained her symptoms.
Each physician ran tests but did not
properly diagnose plaintiff.
Two months later, the physician told her
that the drug used for her kidney problem had burned out her ear.104
•
Plaintiff
continued
to suffer from nausea, loss of equilibrium, and
105
dizziness.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants prescribed her a drug that
was known to have specific side effects, and defendant did not warn
plaintiff of the side effects. 10 6 Plaintiff also argued that defendants
failed to monitor the drug, and her injuries occurred because of the
drug. 0 7 Plaintiff alleged res ipsa loquitor and prefiling certification of
Rule 9 Wviolated the North Carolina Constitution and equal protection
clause.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 0 9 The district court allowed
the defendant's motion to dismiss, because it failed to state a claim for
97

id.

981d
99

Anderson v. Dr. Dean George Assimos, 553 S.E. 2d 63 (2001).
"'Id. at 8.
101Id. at 2.
102Id

'031d. at 4.
l°Anderson, 553 S.E.2d at 4.
05 d. at 5.
"'
107 Id.
1031d.
10 9

Anderson, 553 S.E.2d at 6.
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negligence. 110 Plaintiff argued that she suffered an injury, the injury
did not occur without negligence of another individual, and the injury
was under the control of the defendant.II'
The court reasoned that the jury needed expert testimony to
explain the side effects of gentamicin, and possible harm from
112
defendant's failure to monitor the plaintiff while taking the drug.
The court held that res ipsa loquitor did not apply to plaintiffs
negligence action.' 13 Plaintiff also argued that the trial court erred
in
14
unconstitutional.
was
9j
Rule
because
complaint
dismissing her
Rule 9j restricted a .arty's right to file a negligence claim against a
health care provider.
The court appropriately reasoned that rule 9j
was unconstitutional and void, and reversed and remanded to the trial
court.116 Anderson v. Dr.Dean GeorgeAssimos, 553 S.E. 2d 63 (2001).

NEGLIGENCE
A Preponderance Of Evidence Proved That There Was No Breach
of Standard Of Care Issued to Plaintiff
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, affirmed the
decision of the lower court, which found
injury trial that the defendants
7
did not breach their standard of care."1
Emmette Johnson went to the emergency room of Union
General Hospital in Farmville, La. On Jul 30, 1996, with complaints
of right lower quadrant abdominal pain. Johnson was examined by
Dr. Paul Malabanan, who diagnosed her with acute abdomen and

11Id
..
Id.
at 4.
"'Id.at 8.
11id.

"'Anderson, 553 S.E.2d at 8.

"'Id.at 15.
"'Id.at 15.

17Johnson et al v. St. Francis Medical Center, Inc., et all, 799 So. 2d 671, 672 (C.A.
La. Oct. 31, 2001).
..
1d.at 672-673.
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suspected appendicitis.' 1 9 Johnson was transferred by ambulance to St.
Francis Hospital, where he was to be under the care of Dr. John
Price. 120 Johnson was examined at St. Francis and found to be in no
acute distress and was admitted into a room. 12 1 The next day Johnson
was examined and was noted to be in mild distress with a "washed out"
appearance. 122 Additional exams and test were run by Dr. Price but no
actions were taken. 123 During that morning, Johnson's condition
worsened, his blood pressure was down, and his abdomen was
tender. 124 Dr. Price ordered that Johnson be transferred to the ICU.125
While being examined in the ICU, Johnson coded. 126 Resuscitation was
performed for half an hour before a pulse was obtained. 127 Johnson was
and was found to have a ruptured abdominal aortic
taken to surgery
128
aneurysm.
The plaintiff argued that the evidence clearly established that
Johnson had an abdominal aortic aneurysm upon arrival at St. Francis
and that had his condition been diagnosed and treated earlier, Johnson
would have had an increased chance of survival. 12 9 Plaintiff also argued
that the jury did not address whether the treatment provided by Dr.
Eldridge and Dr. Price fell below the standard of care applicable to
each, but instead determined that Johnson did not lose a chance of
survival. 130 The court found that although there was expert testimony
which included some criticism of the care rendered by the defendants,
the preponderance of the evidence showed that there had been no
breach in the standard of care. 131 Only one expert unequivocally
132
testified that the defendants breached the standard of care.
1191d.

1201d.
12 1

1d.

1 22Johnson,

799 So. 2d at 673.

13Id.

141d at 674.
1

26Id

127

ohnson, 799 So. 2d at 674.
128.1d.
rigid ,at 67 5.
1301d.

1311d. at 680.

132Johnson, 799 So. 2d at 160.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed at the
appellants' cost. 133 Johnson et al v. St. FrancisMedical Center,Inc., et
all, 799 So. 2d 671, 672 (C.A. La. Oct. 31, 2001).
Physician Has Duty To Mother And Unborn Fetus
The Supreme Court of Kansas held that: 1) a physician who has a
physician patient relationship with a pregnant woman has a duty to the
pregnant woman and a duty to the fetus; and 2) a pregnant woman has a
right to know that she has an infectious disease that could be
34
transmitted to her baby during labor and delivery.'
The plaintiff s parents brought action against the physician and the
hospital on behalf of plaintiff.135 Plaintiffs mother was pregnant and
treated by more than one physician during her pregnancy.
Early in
plaintiffs mother's pregnancy, laboratory test revealed that she was a
carrier of hepatitis B. 137 Plaintiffs mother showed no symptoms and
had no other health problems. 138 Plaintiffs mother was never told that
she had hepatitis or that she could pass hepatitis B to plaintiff during
the pregnancy. 139 Each physician had access to plaintiffs mother's
medical records but neither informed plaintiffs mother of her
laboratory results or reviewed her medical records.140 Hepatitis B
status was not transferred to the plaintiffs medical charts.' 4' When
plaintiff was delivered, the pediatrician did not order post-delivery
treatment. 142 Two years after plaintiff s delivery, plaintiff s mother had
a hysterectomy and she was told that she had hepatitis B.143 She was
told that hepatitis B was extremely contagious and that she should have

1331d "
134

Nold v. Binyon, 31 P.3d 274 (2001).
1351d. at 277.
136
1d. at 278.
1371d.
138ITd
"
13 9
Nold, 31 P.3d at 277.
1401d. at 279.
141id. at 281.
142id"
1431d"
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tested. 144 Plaintiff tested positive for the hepatitis B
her family
145
antigen.
The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff.14 6 The district
court excluded the expert testimony by plaintiff's expert regarding the
breach of the standard of care by medical facility's nurses. 147
Defendants argued that their motion to strike the expert witness and its
trial brief were not included in the record on appeal. 14 8 Defendants
contended that these should be have been included on the record at
appeal. 149 The district court found that a physician of a pregnant
woman also has a duty to care for her fetus. 50 If a pregnant woman
the duty does not end until preventive
has an infectious disease,
5
1
provided.1
is
medical care
The court remanded to the lower court to specify the specific
allegations of negligence supported by the evidence.15 2 The court also
held that a physician that has a physician-patient relationship with a
pregnant woman and the same relationship with her fetus. 153 Also the
court found that a mother has a right to know if she has an infectious
54
disease that can be transmitted to her baby during labor and delivery.'
Nold v. Binyon, 31 P.3d274 (2001).
A Visit to Cardiologist after Surgery does not Fall within the Scope
of Continuous Treatment Doctrine
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held the patient's visit to her cardiologist after her surgery did not fall
within the scope of the continuous treatment doctrine, and the nexus
between the cardiologist and the doctor was not strong enough to
44Nold, 31 P.3d at 281.
145ld
1461d. at 277.
at 281.
11d. at 281.
149Nold, 31 P.3d at 281.
'47Id.
14

'-'ld. at 285.
151

1d.
1521d at 289.
1 4

' Nold, 31 P.3d at 289.
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sustain the application of the toll.155 Furthermore, the patient's
equitable estoppel argument was rejected because she failed to allege a
156
claim of fraudulent concealment.
The plaintiff instituted an action of medical malpractice against
Dr. Girardi claiming he negligently grafted a segment of plaintiffs
greater saphenous vein onto a right coronary vein instead of her right
coronary artery during a 1997 surgery.' 57 Plaintiff claims that this
effectively caused a fistula that shunted the affected flow of blood from
her heart into a self-contained systemic loop that sealed off the flow of
1 58
blood from its normal course through the circulatory system.
Plaintiff further claims that Dr. Girardi's negligence aggravated the
damage to plaintiffs heart and exposed her to subsequent lifethreatening surgical procedures. 159 Plaintiff also seeks to hold New
60
York Hospital vicariously liable as the employer of Dr. Girardi.1
Defendants moved for summary judgment, stating that the
action was barred due to the fact that the statute of limitations had run
for the medical malpractice actions. 61 Plaintiff countered that the
statute of limitations should be tolled by the continuous treatment
doctrine. 162 The continuous treatment doctrine tolls the statute of
limitations when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful
acts or missions has run continuously and is related to the same original
condition or complaint. 163 Plaintiff alleged that the complaint began
with the August 18, 1997 surgery performed by Dr. Girardi, and her
last visit to Dr. Girardi's office occurred on October 6, 1997.164
Plaintiff argued that the treatment she received from her cardiologist
after surgery should have been imputed to Dr. Girardi because of the
"nexus" between the doctors. 65 However, the court found the
55

SHaq v. Girardi, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16109 *1 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Sept. 26, 2001).

156 d
1571d.

15 1d.
159

1d.

at *2.

160Haq, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16109 at *2.
16Ild.
1621d "
163
1d"
1
6Id.
16
Haq, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16109 at *3.
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treatment of Plaintiff by Dr. Herrold could not be imputed to Dr.
Girardi without finding some showing of agency or other relevant
The court found no
relationship between the two doctors.1 66
relationship other than that the two doctors were colleagues within the
same hospital, and this was not enough to amount to an agency
relationship.1 67 The court also held that the hospital could not be found
liable since plaintiff did not address the hospital's liability in her brief
in opposition to defendant's motion.' 68 In addition, Dr. Girardi was not
an employee of the hospital, so the hospital could not therefore be held
vicariously69liable for treatment administered by a private attending
physician.'
Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs argument that defendants
should be estopped from invoking the statute of limitations because
plaintiff was deliberately misled about her murmur. 170 The court
reasoned that plaintiff failed to mention this allegation in the complaint
and even if this allegation appeared in the complaint, plaintiff did not
71
argue that there was any fraudulent concealment in the case.'
Therefore, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted
and the complaint was dismissed as time-barred. 172 Haq v. Girardi,
2001 U.S. Dist.Lexis 16109 *1 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Sept. 26, 2001).
Physician Has Duty To Inform Patient That He Performed
Procedure Improperly
The Louisiana Court of Appeals held that a physician's failure to
inform a patient was a breach of his duty. 173
Plaintiff decided that she wanted a bilateral tubal ligation after
giving birth to her baby.' 74 Defendant performed the procedure one-

1661d. at
167

*4.

,d

1681d.
1691d"
17°Haq, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16109 at *1.

171id. at *5.

1721d.
173Smith v. Richard J. Clement, M.D. 797 So.2d 151 (2001).
174

Id.
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month after she delivered her baby. 175 Defendant's medical report
indicated that he removed a part of each fallopian tube.176 Defendant
sent two samples from the operation to the pathology department for
examination. 177 The pathology report indicated that one sample was
from the fallopian tube while the other sample was tissue. 178 Plaintiff
met with defendant twice but was not told of the findings or informed
that she needed to take additional precautions to prevent pregnancy or
consider additional surgery. 179 Eleven months later plaintiff was
pregnant. 8 ° Plaintiff filed claim against defendant alleging that
defendant did not perform the procedure properly, did not verify the
procedure was performed properly, did not inform plaintiff the surgery
was performed improperly, and did not tell plaintiff to take precautions
against pregnancy.18 ' Defendant waived his right to appear before a
medical review panel and plaintiff sued. 8 2 Plaintiff entered a default
judgment against defendant.' 83 The trial court allowed defendant a
default judgment and awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of
$192,749.05.184 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial claiming that
he had not been served with a petition. 185 Defendant also alleged that
86
plaintiff had not established a prima facie case against defendant.
The Patient Compensation Fund (PCF) intervened and appealed on
87
defendant's behalf.1
On appeal, the PCF argued that plaintiff did not establish a case
against defendant and claimed the damages were an error. 18 8 Plaintiff

175a.
17
61d. at 154.
17d. at 154.
178Smith, 797 So.2d at 154.
17
9

1d.

'sold.
18

1d.

1821d.
13
1 Smith, 797 So.2d at 154.
1
84
Id.
18 5

1d"

186Id.
187

id.
' Smith, 797 So.2d at 154.
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sought damages and attorney fees and asserted that89PCF had no right to
intervene or to be granted an appeal in this matter.
The appellate court found that plaintiff established a prima
facie case. 190 It also found that defendant had a duty to take reasonable
care to perform the litigation properly and if he did not perform the
procedure properly he had a duty to tell plaintiff.' 91 The court held that
defendant's failure to inform plaintiff that the procedure might not have
been performed properly was a breach of his duty, and plaintiff
established a prima facie case of negligence.' Smith v. Richard .
Clement, 797 So. 2d 151 (3d Cir. 2001).
Estates can be Liable for Physician's Malpractice
The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
defendant was guilty of medical malpractice. 193
Defendant, Swicegood, was a family practice physician with the
Hull-Swicegood Clinic. 1 94 Plaintiff had been a patient of defendant
since 1990.195 On April 28, 1993, plaintiff saw defendant about a
cold.19 6 At this appointment plaintiff informed him that she could not
afford to continue to be his patient.
Defendant told her he would
continue to treat her free of charge. 198 Defendant also asked for her
home phone number. 199 Shortly after this appointment, defendant
called plaintiff and set up a meeting outside of the office.20 0 Defendant
began a relationship with plaintiff.20 1 This relationship became
progressively more controlling, and as a result, plaintiff became
1891d.
1901d. at 157.
191 d.

192Id.

193Hull-Swicegood Clinic v. Dean, 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 7745 at *1 (2001 Tex. App.,
Nov. 20, 2001).
'941d. at *2.
195
1d.
96
1 Id.

197Id.
193Hull-Swicegood Clinic, 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 7745 at *2.
199
1d.
200
HuI1-Swicegood Clinic, 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 7745 at *2.
20 1
d"
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depressed.2 2 Defendant failed to provide antidepressants or refer her
to a psychiatrist0 or
psychologist. 2 °3 Plaintiff eventually attempted to
24
commit suicide.
Plaintiff filed suit against Swicegood, Hull, and the Clinic in
June 21, 1994.205
Defendant Swicegood committed suicide on
December 6, 1996, and his wife as executrix of his estate was
substituted as a defendant. 20 6 Plaintiff asserted causes of action against
the estate for medical malpractice and against the Clinic for negligent
supervision.2 7 Plaintiff also asserted that the Clinic was vicariously
liable for Swicegood's malpractice because Swicegood was an
employee of the Clinic and injured plaintiff in the course of his
employment.20 8
The case was tried to a jury, which found Swicegood negligently
caused eighty percent of plaintiffs damages and the Clinic negligently
caused twenty percent of her damages. 20 9 The jury also found plaintiff
suffered actual damages and assessed exemplary damages of one
million against the estate. 210 The trial court found no evidence
supporting the finding that the clinic was negligent and set aside this
finding.211 However, the court ruled the clinic was vicariously liable
for Plaintiff's actual damages. 212 The estate appealed stating the trial
court erred in not submitting the jury charge requiring the jury to
determine Plaintiff s comparative fault.213 The court found that these
instructions were not in correct form and therefore the trial court did
not err in refusing to submit them.214 In addition, the Clinic asserted
that no evidence exists to support the jury's finding that Swicegood
202

1d. at *4.
1d.
204

203

Hull-Swicegood Clinic, 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 7745 at *4.
1d.

2 05
207

1d. at *5.

208

,d.

209

IIuU-Swicegood Clinic, 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 7745 at *5.
1d.
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1d.

212id"
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1d.
2 14

at *6.
Hull-Swicegood Clinic, 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 7745 at *6.
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was acting within the scope of employment.215 The court held that the
verdict should be set aside only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming
weight of evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. 2 16 Since
however, the clinic allowed off-site, off-record and no-charge
treatment, the doctor's abandonment
of plaintiff's care was within the
21 7
scope of his employment.
Finally, the estate encouraged the court to overrule Hofer v.
Lavender, which recognized the right to collect exemplary damages
218
The court ruled this case
from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor.
could not be overturned since the state legislature combined this case
law into statutory law under Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice and
219
Remedies Code.
The court further held the determination of an
appropriate amount of exemplary damages is within the discretion of
the jury. 22 The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 22 1 HullSwicegood Clinic v. Dean, 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 7745 at *1 (2001 Tex.
App., Nov. 20, 2001).
PRODUCT TTA"I ITTV
A Claim Arising Out of a Defective Blood Transfusion Does Not Fall
Within the Scope of §5628
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, on writ of certiorari to the Court of
Appeal of the Second Circuit, held a product liability claim arising out
of a defective blood transfusion was not within the scope of §5628 and
remanded the case to district court for further proceedings.222

"'Id.
at *7.
216./d,
117Id.

at *1.
21Id. at *8.

219Hull-Swicegood Clinic, 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 7745 at *8.

2Id at *10.
v. Jackson Parish Hospital, 2001 La. LEXIS 2864 at *1 (S.C. of La. Oct

221Id

222Williams

16, 2001).

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 5: 375

On May 29, 1980, Nelson Nadine Wilson, plaintiff, received a
blood transfusion during childbirth at Jackson Parish Hospital.223 A
decade and a half later, William's doctor informed her that she had
contracted Hepatitis C, which most likely resulted from the blood
transfusion which had occurred in 1980.224 On April 17, 1997,
Williams filed a complaint with the Patient's Compensation Fund
pursuant to the Medical Malpractice Act. 225 Williams alleged that
Jackson Parish Hospital was strictly liable for the damages incurred by
the 1980 sale and administration of defective blood or blood
products.22 6 Alternatively, Williams alleged that the hospital "deviated
from the applicable standards of appropriate medical care regarding the
collection, testing, sale and administration of blood or blood products
and the care
and treatment which they provided to Nelson Nadine
227
Williams.
In response, Jackson Parish Hospital filed an exception of
prescription in the district court citing the one year and three year
prescriptive periods of §5628.228 The district court found that even
though Williams filed within one year of discovering her cause of
action, the claim was governed by the three year statute of limitations,
which must be filed within three years of the complained of act, in this
case the blood transfusion. 229 The district court refused to reach the
constitutionality of §5628 because the issue was not the focus of the
argument, regardless of the fact that there was no way for Williams to
comply with the three year deadline because the error was not found
until after the three year period expired.23°
On appeal, Williams argued that the general tort prescriptive
period, which is one year form the date of discovery, applied to her
strict liability cause of action. 231 The court of appeals affirmed the
findings of the district court that William's claim was prescribed under
22'Id. at *2.
22 4

!d.

225Ird
"

r6d.
22 7

Williams, 2001 La LEXIS 2864 at *2.

28Id.
229

1d

0

23Id. at *3.

23Id.
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the three-year period under §5628, but remanded the case to district
court for a hearing on the constitutional issues. 23 2 After an evidentiary
hearing on demand, the district court adopted its earlier findings
regarding the application of §5628.233 The case was then appealed to
the Supreme Court.
In deciding this case, the court looked at the earlier decision of
Boutte v. Jefferson Parish Hospital Service District No. 1, 759 So.2d
45, where the Supreme Court of Louisiana reasoned that because a strict
products liability claim was statutorily defined as "malpractice" under
the MIMA, it likewise met §5628's second requirement that the action
arise out of "patient care." 234 Here, the court found the ruling in Boutte
to be a mistake, and overruled the decision for five reasons: 1) Boutte
ignored well established principles of interpreting prescriptive statutes;
2) Boutte ignored the Legislature's placement of §5628 as a separate
statutory provision, apart from either the MMA or the MSLLA, and
ignored the existence in §5628 of its own conduct-based standard that
governs the scope of its application; 3) Boutte failed to recognize the
lack of any evidence suggesting legislature intended the MIIMA's
expanded definition of malpractice to apply in any context other than
the MMA; 4) relying on Boutte's analysis in future cases will lead to
questionable, if not constitutionally infirm, results; and 5) Boutte
ignores §5628's legislative history. 235 Accordingly, the court reversed
the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to district
court for further proceedings.2 36 Williams v. Jackson Parish Hospital,
2001 La. LEXIS 2864 at *1(S.C. of La. Oct 16, 2001).

232Williams, 2001 La LEXIS 2864 at *3.
' 33 d. at *3-4.
24MId. at *12.

23'ld. at *13-16.
261d.at *16.
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WRONGFUL DEATH
Hospital's Advice Line That Follows Proper Protocol Not Liable
For Death
The Court of Appeals of Ohio held that an advice line that followed
proper protocol was not liable for plaintiffs death. 237
Plaintiff s administrix died shortly after being born prematurely.238
The administrix filed suit against the defendant and the medical staff
that treated her. 239 The administrix alleged that defendant's medical
advice line told her to go to the hospital until the following morning.240
The administrix also alleged that the delivering obstetrician told her
that if24she
1 had come the previous evening they could have stopped her
labor.
The administrix asserted claims for medical malpractice, wrongful
death, violation of her right to access of her medical records, and
spoliation of evidence. 242 Defendants moved to dismiss all but the
wrongful death and loss of the chance of survival claims. 243 The trial
court ruled in favor of defendants.244 The administrix appealed. 245 The
administrix contended that the expert testimony was a surprise, the trial
court should not have denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict,
and the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new
46
trial.

2

The court found that the expert's testimony did not exceed
the scope of his report. 247 The court reasoned that there was no unfair
surprise. 2 48 The court further reasoned that the jury could have reached
237Preston v. Kaiser Permanente, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 4988.
2 8Id at 23.
'"'Id.at2.
240id.
241

1d.
2Preston, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis at 2.

243

d

244id.
245
246Md.
Id. at 10.
247
Preston, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis at 14.
248Id
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different conclusions from the evidence presented and properly denied
the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Furthermore,
the advice line followed protocol by administering treatment, and the
•• 251 were negligent. 250 The court
administrix failed to show theS nurses
affirmed the lower courts' decision. Preston v. Kaiser Permanente,
2001 Ohio App. Lexis 4988.

ANTITRUST
Bid to Provide Health Care Services to Aircraft Company does not
Violate Antitrust Statutes
The United States District Court denied plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction against defendant252health care company's bid
and held that defendant's contract stands.
Plaintiff brought an antitrust action alleging that defendant
engaged in a scheme under which plaintiff was underbid on a contract
to provide health insurance to employees of an aircraft company.253
Plaintiff raised claims of anticompetitive conduct in violation of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by predatory pricing. 4 Plaintiffs
also contended that defendant's actions represented unlawful use of
defendant's alleged monopoly powers
and that defendant tortiously
255
rights.
contractual
its
with
interfered
To obtain the injunctive relief, the court stated plaintiff must show
that it would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the
injury to it outweighed any potential damages to the defendant, that the
injunction was not adverse to the public interest, and that there was a
substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits. 256 In addition,
"Id. at 17.
'"0Id. at 22.
251Id.
252 Coventry Health Care of Kansas, Inc. v. Via Christi Health System, Inc.,
2001 U.S.
Dist.
Lexis
21389
*1
(U.S.
Dist.,
Dec.
19,
2001).
25 3
1d. at * 1.
4
Id.
2551d

'61d. at *14.

DEPAuL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 5: 375

plaintiff must prove the claim of predatory pricing by showing proof of
a relevant geographic and product market, specific intent of the
defendant to monopolize the market, anticompetitive conduct by the
defendant in furtherance of this attempt, and the
dangerous probability
257
that the defendant will succeed in this attempt.
The court found that plaintiffs failed to present evidence showing
an award of injunctive relief was necessary to protect them from
irreparable injury, and failed to show a reasonable likelihood that they
would prevail on the merits.2 58 Furthermore, the court found that
issuing 25
a preliminary injunction would actually be adverse to the public
interest.
The evidence also did not show that defendants bid was based
upon pricing below an appropriate measure of cost but rather suggested
simply that defendant had a lower level of physician costs and was
more efficient because of their adoption of the DRG-based
reimbursement.26 ° In addition, no evidence was available to establish a
market in which defendants threatened to acquire the ability to impose
supracompetitive pricing. 261 Instead, the evidence showed a strong
market for managed care services in an area that was extremely
262
competitive.2
Any attempt to impose monopoly pricing would be met
263
with a variety of responses that would destroy this attempt.
Therefore, given the evidence presented to the court, the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate that preliminary injunctive relief was justified.2 4
Coventry Health Care of KansasInc. v. Via ChristiHealth System, Inc.,
2001 U.S. DistLexis 21389 at *1 (TJS. Dist., Dec. 19, 2001).
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